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Abstract 
Having undergone mergers with Uber China and Uber Southeast Asia in the past few years, DiDi 
and Grab now hold over 90% and 80% of the market shares in China and Singapore. This market 
control has allowed them to dominate the rideshare industry in the two countries, and this paper 
examines the impact of Grab and DiDi’s monopolistic power on rideshare drivers. Specifically, 
this research considers changes to both licensure requirements, pricing policies, commission 
rates, insurance coverage, and CSR programs as well as long-term corporate objectives and 
strategies following the merger. In order to understand the implications of DiDi and Grab’s 
decrease in competition and greater market control, this research draws from existing scholarly 
research, DiDi and Grab’s policies and terms of use, news articles, reports, government 
documents, and most importantly, qualitative interviews with employees at DiDi and Grab. The 
paper concludes that despite changes in pricing, insurance, and benefits, monopolistic 
ridesharing companies are able to leverage their resources and market power for diversification, 
which creates synergies, and greater social impact. 
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Introduction 
 
In the past decade, the world has witnessed the rapid rise of the gig economy, a market system 
based on temporary contract work as opposed to permanent employment. Because the gig 
economy affords workers a greater degree of flexibility and independence, people are 
increasingly choosing to take on gig work over traditional job arrangements. The ridesharing 
industry comprises an especially large segment of the growing gig economy. Since the founding 
of Uber in 2009, ride hailing businesses have taken off around the world, gaining an especially 
strong foothold in Asia with Didi Chuxing (DiDi) in China and Grab in Southeast Asia, among 
others.  
 
While the U.S. rideshare industry remains divided between Uber and Lyft, companies like DiDi 
and Grab have acquired much greater market control in some of the markets that they operate in. 
DiDi and Grab merged with Uber China and Uber Southeast Asia in 2016 and 2018 respectively, 
and the two companies now exercise monopoly power in China and Singapore. ,   1 2
 
This research study seeks to examine how DiDi and Grab have taken advantage of the market 
control and lack of competition in these two markets to shape the landscape of the ridesharing 
industry in Asia. While news media and existing scholarly research are both relatively attuned to 
the rider experience and riders’ demands and concerns, this research looks at the implications of 
the monopolistic market control of ride hailing companies for rideshare drivers. Specifically, this 
study aims to understand the changes that are brought about by the decrease in competition and 
greater market control following mergers in this industry as well as how drivers experience these 
changes. While monopolies are frequently viewed as socially nonoptimal and inefficient, this 
research explores how monopolies in the rideshare industry have used their monopoly power to 
improve the driver experience and engage in social impact. Beyond examining key changes in 
DiDi and Grab’s licensure requirements, pricing policies, commission rates, insurance coverage, 
and CSR programs, this research also assesses long-term changes in corporate objectives and 
strategies. After providing some background information on these two companies and the 
ridesharing industry at large, this paper will dive into specific post-merger business decisions and 
strategies before closing with an analysis of the applicability of these lessons and findings to the 
ride hailing industry in the United States and beyond.  
 
  
1 Savannah Dowling, "How Didi Partnered And Burned Its Way To Market Leadership In China," Crunchbase, last 
modified May 23, 2018, accessed May 23, 2020, 
https://news.crunchbase.com/news/how-didi-partnered-and-burned-its-way-to-market-leadership-in-china/. 
2 Jon Russell, "Grab's acquisition of Uber Southeast Asia drives into problems," TechCrunch, last modified April 25, 
2018, accessed May 23, 2020, https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/24/grab-uber-deal-southeast-asia/. 
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Research Objectives 
 
Although the ridesharing business model was unknown to the world just over a decade ago, the 
industry has rapidly developed, and decisions being made today at companies like Uber and 
Grab will undoubtedly leave a lasting legacy on the future of transportation. Researchers have 
spent the past few years understanding the economics and marketplace dynamics of the 
two-sided ridesharing market, but there remains much to be explored when it comes to the 
impact of varying market structures on the ride hailing industry. Furthermore, current research 
focuses overwhelmingly on the ridesharing industry in the United States, leaving notable gaps in 
knowledge when it comes to ride hailing in the rest of the world. Through conducting this 
research, I hope to uncover valuable insights regarding how monopoly power in the ride hailing 
markets in Asia enables companies to effectively leverage their control for the benefit of drivers 
and more successfully pursue profitability through achieving greater economies of scale and 
diversification.  
 
This research project focuses on DiDi and Grab not only because they’re two of the biggest ride 
hailing companies internationally but also because both have experienced the transition from a 
more competitive market to one where they hold the dominant position. Moreover, since both 
companies operate in Asia, they are faced with similar regulatory environments and cultural 
contexts, which play a huge role in informing corporate-level decisions. These shared 
characteristics coupled with the fact that the two companies have a longstanding partnership and 
vested interests in each other make DiDi and Grab the ideal companies to investigate and 
compare for this research study.  In fact, in 2017, DiDi and SoftBank Group Corp. collectively 3
invested US$2 billion in Grab, solidifying the relationship between the two ride hailing giants.   4
 
Despite the regional focus of this research, the findings of this study have broader implications 
for both ridesharing companies’ policies and government regulations of ridesharing companies 
all around the world. With ride hailing also on the rise in Australia, the MENA region, and Latin 
America, gaining insight into the impact of monopolistic ride hailing companies like DiDi and 
Grab on drivers will be critical for understanding the potential for greater social impact in the 
ridesharing market. Even though rideshare companies are actively engaged in CSR programs and 
are committed to ensuring drivers’ earnings and safety, it is nevertheless important to look at 
how rideshare companies can do a better job of guaranteeing insurance coverage, earning 
opportunities, stable incomes, medical leave, and future job opportunities, among other benefits 
3 Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "Milestones," DiDi, accessed June 1, 2020, 
https://www.didiglobal.com/about-special/milestone. 
4 ​Grab, "Grab Announces Didi Chuxing and SoftBank As Lead Investors for Current Round of Financing," Grab, 
last modified July 24, 2017, accessed June 4, 2020, 
https://www.grab.com/sg/press/business/grab-announces-didi-chuxing-softbank-lead-investors-current-round-financ
ing/. 
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for their drivers. Additionally, this research study is relevant for government entities that may be 
considering whether or not they need to engage in greater regulation of the ride hailing market; 
this research suggests that in the interest of the drivers, government authorities should not break 
up monopolies in the rideshare industry but should actively work with them in certain areas in 
order to ensure that their market control is leveraged for social impact.  
 
Lastly, by way of exploring the business decisions and social impact of rideshare companies that 
operate in a monopolistic market in Asia, this research seeks to forecast and understand the 
future of ride hailing in the U.S. Naturally, both Uber and Lyft have aspirations to capture the 
entirety of the ridesharing market in America and gain market control so that they can achieve 
stronger network effects and profitability.  While the two companies are still locked into a fierce 5
price war, it’s unclear if one player will eventually come to monopolize and dominate the 
American ride hailing market. If that does happen, DiDi and Grab could serve as useful 
projections for what that market might look like for drivers. 
 
Research Methodology 
 
In order to achieve this research goal, this study will look at the circumstances for rideshare 
drivers in China and Singapore before and after DiDi and Grab’s mergers with Uber. As 
aforementioned, company policies regarding licensure requirements, insurance coverage, pricing, 
driver commissions, and CSR programs will serve as the basis for this research. While this 
research focuses on understanding the unique changes in the Chinese and Singaporean rideshare 
markets, it also looks at them in conjunction and draws conclusions from comparing and 
contrasting the two.  
 
This research includes both primary and secondary sources and uses existing scholarly research 
on the rideshare industry and on DiDi and Grab in particular as a starting point for understanding 
the economics of monopolistic rideshare companies. This is supplemented by an in-depth 
examination of DiDi and Grab’s policies and terms and conditions, which help provide insight 
into the nature of the contractual relationships drivers enter into when they begin working for 
rideshare companies. Additionally, I gathered information from news articles, reports by DiDi 
and Grab, and the News and Blog sections of their websites. In order to better understand the 
regulatory environments in China and Singapore, I also reviewed government documents that 
discuss the mergers and their consequences. The bulk of the research was done through 
qualitative interviews with employees at DiDi and Grab as well as labor union representatives, 
who added the perspective of rideshare drivers to the research study. While some of the 
5 Jeff Spross, "Uber is basically promising investors it will become a monopoly," The Week, last modified April 15, 
2019, accessed August 8, 2020, 
https://theweek.com/articles/834836/uber-basically-promising-investors-become-monopoly. 
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interviewees were comfortable with having their names included in this research paper, most of 
the employees who were interviewed preferred to stay anonymous due to the nature of the topic 
and its relevance to their work and company. Information from these interviews have been 
anonymized and aggregated, and the insights acquired from these interviews are scattered 
throughout the paper.  
 
While this research endeavors to provide a full picture of the nature of monopolistic rideshare 
markets through looking at DiDi in China and Grab in Singapore, there are several limitations 
that are worth mentioning. This research project was originally intended to be conducted in 
China and Singapore, where I would have had the chance to interview DiDi and Grab drivers and 
hear their opinions. Because of COVID-19, I was unable to travel and instead interviewed people 
online. This made it much more difficult to identify and interview drivers, so the perspective of 
drivers in this research study is limited to the information I gathered from speaking with labor 
union industrial relations officers who represent private hire car drivers and reading news articles 
that included driver interviews. One additional limitation to this research is that certain data and 
information about DiDi and Grab are not publicly available because both companies are 
currently privately held and have yet to IPO.  
 
Background on the Ridesharing Market 
 
This research focuses specifically on the nature of monopolistic rideshare markets. However, this 
paper will begin by providing some useful context regarding the economics of the ridesharing 
industry before diving into region-specific examples. Ride hailing platforms like Uber, DiDi, and 
Grab operate as two-sided markets that experience significant two-sided network effects, which 
means that the value for drivers and riders increases as the number of the other increases.  In 6
order for a platform to achieve the strongest two-sided network effects, it must continually work 
to increase the number of drivers on the platform and then increase the number of riders, and so 
on, constantly balancing marketplace supply and demand. Consequently, rideshare companies 
tend to do better when they operate in a monopolistic market or when they compete with other 
companies but neither the drivers nor the riders engage in multihoming, which refers to the 
practice of switching between multiple platforms.  As such, theoretically monopolistic rideshare 7
companies that are able to drive users to their platform and make the best use of these network 
effects will achieve the highest prices and greatest profits.  At the same time, however, these 8
6 Linyan Feng, "DiDi Loses Significant Money on its Rides," EqualOcean, last modified May 2, 2019, accessed June 
10, 2020, https://equalocean.com/auto/20190502-didi-losses-significant-money-on-its-rides. 
7 Chunchun Liu et al., "Multihoming and oligopolistic platform competition" (unpublished manuscript, National 
University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore, September 17, 2019), 2, accessed June 26, 2020, 
http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/ecsjkdw/multihoming%20and%20platform%20competition%20190917.pdf. 
8 Kevin A. Bryan and Joshua S. Gans, "A Theory of Multihoming in Rideshare Competition," ​Journal of Economics 
& Management Strategy​ 28, no. 1 (2019): 94, https://www.nber.org/papers/w24806.pdf. 
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monopolistic rideshare companies may be socially optimal in terms of minimizing wait times for 
riders and reducing idling for drivers.  9
 
According to a model created by researchers at the National University of Singapore using real 
data on the ridesharing economy in the United States, the entrance of a new player into the ride 
hailing market leads to a reduction in both driver earnings and platform profit.  Additionally, an 10
increase in multihoming also results in a decrease in platform profit, so rideshare companies are 
generally better off when they achieve monopoly control and maintain it by discouraging the 
entry of new players.   11
 
Although being a monopoly in the rideshare industry naturally implies that the company 
dominates the ride hailing market in that country, the ridesharing industry also competes with 
other modes of transportation. For example, rideshare companies view both traditional taxi 
companies and public transportation, which operate in slightly different segments of the 
transportation industry, as competitors.  Regardless of how much market share a monopoly 12
holds in the ride hailing market, the company will still have to provide their service for a low 
enough price such that riders won’t opt for other means of transportation. 
 
Independent Contractor vs. Employee Debate 
 
By virtue of being a part of the gig economy, ride hailing companies classify their drivers as 
independent contractors and not employees. There is a longstanding debate about whether gig 
economy workers should be considered by law to be employees at the companies they work for, 
and this has become an increasingly contentious issue in the U.S. and especially in California.  13
Traditionally, this relationship is defined in terms of payment method, duration, type of work, 
and the amount of control the employer wields over the agent, among other factors.  14
Accordingly, rideshare drivers are considered independent contractors and not employees 
because they are paid per job instead of by salary and ride hailing companies have no direct 
supervision or control over them.  15
9 Ibid, 95. 
10 Liu et al., "Multihoming and oligopolistic," 4. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Arvind Swaminathan, Zoom interview by author, August 3, 2020. 
13 Jay Peters and Andrew J. Hawkins, "Uber and Lyft ordered by California judge to classify drivers as employees," 
The Verge, last modified August 10, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020, 
https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/10/21362460/uber-lyft-drivers-employees-california-court-ruling. 
14 Ben Z. Steinberger, "Redefining 'Employee' in the Gig Economy: Shielding Workers from the Uber Model.," 
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law​ 23, no. 2 (2018): 581, 
https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy.library.upenn.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=129502056&site=ehost
-live. 
15 Ibid, 584. 
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As the name suggests, independent contractors are afforded greater flexibility and autonomy than 
employees, but the other side of the coin is that they lack the security and benefits that are 
provided by companies for their employees.  Rideshare drivers must pay all of their costs (fuel 16
costs, maintenance costs, not to mention costs associated with purchasing or renting a car) out of 
pocket, and they are not entitled to employee benefits like unemployment compensation, 
workers’ compensation, health insurance, and employee retirement benefits. ,   17 18
 
Because these benefits are not guaranteed for independent contractors, this opens up the 
possibility for ride hailing companies to engage in social impact not only for their riders but also 
for their drivers. Rideshare companies like DiDi and Grab have taken important steps in recent 
years to provide insurance coverage for their drivers and offer drivers some sort of assurance for 
their earnings, safety, and future.  However, much more can be done in the way of protecting 19
drivers and ensuring their wellbeing in the long term. Interestingly, the independent contractor 
versus employee debate is much less heated and disputed in Asia, and key stakeholders have for 
the most part shelved this debate so that they can focus on creating a collaborative and 
sustainable industry. In any case, this paper will continue to examine how DiDi and Grab, as 
rideshare companies with monopolistic market control, have stepped in to provide these benefits 
for their drivers as well as where they’ve fallen short of driver needs.  
 
Didi Chuxing 
 
Company Overview 
 
DiDi was first launched in China in 2012 by founder Cheng Wei, although at the time it existed 
as two separate companies, DiDi Dache and Kuaidi Dache.  In 2015, DiDi Dache and Kuaidi 20
Dache merged, with the combined company taking on the name Didi Chuxing; DiDi controlled 
60% of the company due to its higher ride volume.  In August of the following year, DiDi 21
16 Stan Malos, Gretchen Vogelgesang Lester, and Meghna Virick, "Uber Drivers and Employment Status in the Gig 
Economy: Should Corporate Social Responsibility Tip the Scales?," ​Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal 
30, no. 4 (December 2018): 241, http://dx.doi.org.proxy.library.upenn.edu/10.1007/s10672-018-9325-9. 
17 Henry Ross, "Ridesharing's House of Cards: O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. and the Viability of Uber's 
Labor Model in Washington," ​Washington Law Review​ 90, no. 3 (October 2015): 1432, 
https://proxy.library.upenn.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.proxy.library.upenn.edu/docview/176437479
1?accountid=14707. 
18 ​Malos, Lester, and Virick, "Uber Drivers," 240. 
19 Arvind Swaminathan, Zoom interview by author, August 3, 2020. 
20 ​Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "Milestones," DiDi. 
21 ​Brad Stone and Lulu Yilun Chen, "Uber Slayer: How China's Didi Beat the Ride-Hailing Superpower," 
Bloomberg, last modified October 6, 2016, accessed June 26, 2020, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-didi-cheng-wei/. 
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acquired Uber China, with Uber taking a 17.7% stake in the company and $1 billion in cash.  22
This merger resulted in a combined market share of around 95%, and DiDi continues to 
dominate the Chinese ride hailing market today, with over ten billion rides annually. ,  23 24
Although this merger prompted an investigation by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, DiDi has 
yet to receive a ruling four years after the initial merger.  At present, DiDi is one of the most 25
highly valued startups in the world, and the company is backed by two of China’s biggest tech 
companies, Alibaba and Tencent.  Besides China, DiDi now operates in eight international 26
markets, but as aforementioned, this research focuses specifically on DiDi’s operations and 
strategy in the Chinese market because of its monopolistic market control there. 
 
Becoming a Driver 
 
In the years since the merger with Uber, becoming a driver for DiDi has become slightly more 
difficult. This change was not a direct consequence of the merger but rather a side effect of DiDi 
focusing more on driver quality for the long term and the government imposing greater 
regulations on the monopoly. Ride hailing is almost always an undersupplied market, and in a 
country with close to 1.4 billion people, one of the primary challenges is maintaining a large 
enough supply of drivers to meet rider demand.  For that reason, being too selective with its 27
driver supply or instituting too many licensure requirements would not serve DiDi well. 
However, as the priority has shifted from attracting drivers from competing platforms to 
guaranteeing driver quality, the requirements for becoming a driver for DiDi have also become 
more onerous to meet. This coupled with the fact that the Chinese government and local 
governments are tightening regulations on DiDi means that becoming a driver on the platform 
has gradually increased in difficulty. 
 
To begin, there is a fairly high cost of compliance, as prospective drivers must study for and take 
an exam and register their vehicle as a commercial vehicle.  On top of existing maintenance and 28
insurance fees, the cost that comes with acquiring a commercial car license may render driving 
22 Ibid. 
23 ​Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "About Us," DiDi, accessed June 1, 2020, 
https://www.didiglobal.com/about-didi/about-us. 
24 ​Savannah Dowling, "How Didi Partnered And Burned Its Way To Market Leadership In China," Crunchbase, last 
modified May 23, 2018, accessed May 23, 2020, 
https://news.crunchbase.com/news/how-didi-partnered-and-burned-its-way-to-market-leadership-in-china/. 
25 ​Yujie Xie, "What Didi's Blackout Exposed About the Ride-Hailing Industry," Sixth Tone, last modified 
September 28, 2018, accessed June 9, 2020, 
https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1002992/what-didis-blackout-exposed-about-the-ride-hailing-industry. 
26 ​Stone and Chen, "Uber Slayer," Bloomberg. 
27 ​Xinyu Zhang, "How Didi Works," PingWest, last modified August 29, 2017, accessed August 15, 2020, 
https://en.pingwest.com/a/112. 
28 ​Rita Liao, "China's Didi adds driver training program to counter sharp decline in rides," TechCrunch, last 
modified November 28, 2018, accessed June 4, 2020, https://techcrunch.com/2018/11/28/didi-driver-program/. 
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for DiDi unprofitable for some part time drivers on the platform.  After acquiring a vehicle 29
registration license, drivers must also undergo a background check, which DiDi conducts in 
collaboration with the Criminal Investigation Department, the Chinese Ministry of Public 
Security, and the local police department.  Due to its two high profile murder cases in 2018, 30
DiDi ramped up safety measures as well, requiring all drivers to participate in their Compulsory 
Online Driver Safety Training Program and take separate driver training modules.  Furthermore, 31
drivers are required to complete additional identification checks like daily facial recognitions, 
further background checks, and vehicle and driver compliance checks.  Between the extra cost 32
and heightened compliance standards, drivers may find it more and more difficult to not only 
qualify to drive for DiDi but also stay on the platform. DiDi’s website writes that in 2017, the 
year after the merger with Uber, DiDi rejected, on average, 40,000 driver applications each day 
because the applicants did not meet the qualification and compliance requirements to become a 
driver.   33
 
Beyond these standardized requirements, DiDi has also faced stricter local regulation with 
regards to driver onboarding in recent years. In 2016, the Chinese government legalized online 
ride hailing companies through the passage of its Interim Measures for the Administration of 
Online Car Hiring Business Operations and Services.  However, local governments have since 34
passed their own versions of these measures, instituting new and different regulations for drivers 
in various cities. For example, in an effort to weed out so-called “black car” drivers (a term that 
refers to unlicensed drivers), many cities have added an additional license requirement for 
drivers to their local city laws.  In Beijing and Shanghai, drivers must have a ​hukou​, a 35
household registration in the city, in order to drive, in effect preventing anyone who traveled to 
the city for work from driving for DiDi.  This double license policy, which was formally 36
29 ​Rita Liao, "The end of China's ridesharing gig," TechCrunch, last modified January 1, 2019, accessed June 22, 
2020, https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/01/end-of-chinas-ride-sharing-gig/. 
30 Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "DiDi Safety," DiDi, accessed June 1, 2020, 
https://www.didiglobal.com/science/security. 
31 ​Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "DiDi Resumes Late-Night Ride-Hailing with Enhanced Safety Measures," DiDi, last 
modified September 14, 2018, accessed June 3, 2020, 
https://www.didiglobal.com/news/newsDetail?id=542&type=blog. 
32 ​Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "DiDi China Concludes Safety Revamp with Official Report Submitted to Ministry of 
Transport," DiDi, last modified October 24, 2019, accessed June 3, 2020, 
https://www.didiglobal.com/news/newsDetail?id=791&type=blog. 
33 ​Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "DiDi Resumes," DiDi. 
34 ​Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "NDRC investigates implementation of local car-hailing policies and officials call for 
stricter review," DiDi, last modified December 17, 2017, accessed June 3, 2020, 
https://www.didiglobal.com/news/newsDetail?id=337&type=blog. 
35 ​Julie Yujie Chen and Jack Linchuan Qiu, "Digital utility: Datafication, regulation, labor, and DiDi's 
platformization of urban transport in China," ​Chinese Journal of Communication​ 12, no. 3 (2019): 282, 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17544750.2019.1614964. 
36 ​Josh Horowitz, "One year after the Uber-Didi merger, it's only getting harder to hail a ride in China," Quartz, last 
modified August 3, 2017, accessed June 21, 2020, 
https://qz.com/1045268/one-year-after-the-uber-didi-merger-its-only-getting-harder-to-hail-a-ride-in-china/. 
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implemented on January 1st, 2019, mandates that all drivers hold both a commercial vehicle 
license and local residency permit in the city they are working.  37
 
These regulations have made it significantly harder for aspiring drivers to start driving for DiDi 
and for drivers who are already on the platform to continue, especially if they were previously 
driving part time. The new requirements are varied in nature, but they make it both more costly 
and more time consuming to get certified as a driver on DiDi. The commercial vehicle license, 
test, and newfound safety requirements increase the barrier to driving, and the local adaptations 
to the national measures that legalized ride hailing across China have limited the potential driver 
pool to a smaller group of people who have residency permits and the money to acquire the 
commercial license. While these problems and hurdles to becoming a driver aren’t unique to 
DiDi, they are in part brought about by DiDi’s change in focus following the merger and the 
increase in government scrutiny that resulted from the exit of Uber from the market.  
 
Insurance Coverage 
 
As DiDi has diversified into financial and insurance services, coverage options for drivers have 
increased. Shortly after the double license regulation came into effect in 2019, DiDi moved into 
financial technology and insurance, and the company began providing both health and car 
insurance for its drivers in an effort to decrease the barrier of entry and compensate for the high 
compliance costs.   38
 
In 2015, DiDi first partnered with Ping An Property Insurance to launch its DiDi General 
Accident Insurance Plan.  The general insurance plan automatically applied to all DiDi drivers 39
and riders at no cost, and it allocated up to CNY 1.2 million per person in the case of injury, 
disability, or death resulting from accidents.  However, it’s unclear if this plan still exists, as 40
there is no documentation for it on DiDi’s website besides the 2015 article in the News Center, 
and articles from 2019 write that DiDi was planning on working with Chinese insurance 
companies to launch an accident insurance plan that covers up to CNY 1.2 million.  While it is 41
unclear whether DiDi provides general accident insurance for all of its drivers and riders at the 
37 ​Jon Russell, "Didi launches lending and insurance as new regulation threatens to lower driver numbers," 
TechCrunch, last modified January 2, 2019, accessed July 5, 2020, 
https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/01/didi-launches-lending-and-insurance/. 
38 Ibid. 
39 ​Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "DiDi pioneers general rideshare insurance program," DiDi, last modified October 26, 
2015, accessed June 3, 2020, https://www.didiglobal.com/news/newsDetail?id=298&type=news. 
40 Ibid. 
41 ​Reuters Staff, "China's Didi plans to relaunch Hitch service with new safety features," Reuters, last modified July 
18, 2019, accessed August 16, 2020, 
https://cn.reuters.com/article/china-didi-chuxing/chinas-didi-plans-to-relaunch-hitch-service-with-new-safety-feature
s-idUSL4N24J22I. 
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moment, DiDi’s website does state that the company offers assistance and aid in the case of 
injury or sudden death, though it does not specify a maximum amount.   42
 
As for automobile insurance, DiDi drivers can purchase insurance for their vehicles directly in 
the app, which recommends different insurance policies based on drivers’ individual needs.  43
DiDi’s diversification into financial services following the merger has made it easier for drivers 
to purchase automobile insurance through the app, and this accessibility may be important for 
segments of the driver population that have lower financial literacy. However, besides car 
insurance, it is difficult to tell whether DiDi also provides commercial vehicle insurance and 
accident insurance for its drivers. 
 
Driver Earnings 
 
When DiDi and Uber China first merged in 2016, drivers worried that the exit of Uber from the 
market and the establishment of DiDi as the monopoly power in the region would have a strong 
negative bearing on their earnings. Many assumed that DiDi would lower fares and increase its 
commission rate in order to maximize profit, and drivers were especially concerned about DiDi 
cutting their incentives, which at the time made up a significant portion of their income. While 
there was a drastic drop in the incentives that were given out to drivers following the merger, the 
pricing structure and commission rate has stayed roughly the same. Drivers are also still able to 
make a living through driving on the platform because of the heightened demand on the 
platform. 
 
Although DiDi does not disclose its pricing mechanism and fare structure because they constitute 
valuable intellectual property, DiDi does have upfront fares and dynamic pricing, which helps 
balance supply and demand in the market. As is the case for other ride hailing companies, DiDi 
operates using a commission model, where the company takes a percentage of the fare for each 
trip. Given that DiDi has wielded market control in China since 2016, the company could have 
theoretically hiked up its commission rate after Uber left the market. However, DiDi’s platform 
commission hasn’t increased dramatically and has actually remained very reasonable. For 
reference, in 2016, Uber took at least 25% of driver revenue through its platform commission.  44
Based on data from the fourth quarter of 2018, DiDi executive Chen Xi revealed that the 
42 ​Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "DiDi Safety," DiDi. 
43 ​Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "DiDi Car Insurance," DiDi, accessed August 16, 2020, 
https://www.didiglobal.com/financial-business/car-insure. 
44 ​Patricia Leighton, "Professional self-employment, new power and the sharing economy: Some cautionary tales 
from Uber," ​Journal of Management and Organization​ 22, no. 6 (November 2016): 864, 
http://dx.doi.org.proxy.library.upenn.edu/10.1017/jmo.2016.30. 
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platform was averaging a commission rate of around 19%.  Instead of using a steady 45
commission rate that is applied consistently across rides, DiDi actually takes different percentage 
commissions on different rides. This commission ranges from below 15% to above 25%, with 
that middle section counting for around 60% of rides (20% of the time, the commission rate will 
be below 15% and another 20% of the time, the commission rate will be above 25%).  46
Surprisingly, the commission that DiDi gets from its rides is not even sufficient to cover all of its 
costs, and over a third of the commission ends up going back towards incentives and subsidies 
that benefit the drivers directly.  In fact, this 19% average commission comes short of 47
completely covering DiDi’s taxes, fees, operational costs, and driver incentives, so DiDi actually 
takes around a 2% loss on every drive.   48
 
While it seems strange that a ride hailing company with over 90% market share cannot even 
break even with the revenue it gets from its platform commission, this reality actually highlights 
the issue of undersupply in the ride hailing market. Supply management lies at the core of DiDi’s 
decision making when it comes to pricing and commissions, and the imbalance between supply 
and demand in the ridesharing market represents a severe constraint on the company. Even 
though DiDi acquired Uber and presently controls the market, it must sustain a large enough 
supply of drivers to meet market demand. As such, DiDi is unable to use its monopoly power to 
exploit its drivers and maximize profit, and the commission rates are generally low enough for 
drivers to continue to earn their livelihoods on the platform. In 2017, DiDi drivers earned an 
average of CNY 160 each day, and DiDi’s Report on Job Creation in Restructuring Industries 
reported that over three quarters of DiDi drivers were able to make at least as much as they did 
during their previous job by driving on the platform. ,  In addition, over 1.3 million DiDi 49 50
drivers were the sole earners for their families.  While CNY 160 is by no means a lot of money, 51
DiDi has taken care to maintain its fares and commission rates at a level that allows those who 
drive full time on the platform to make a living through the job. DiDi’s platform commission 
remains fairly reasonable, and DiDi has chosen to pay for certain costs itself instead of raising its 
commission rates.  
45 ​Xi Chen to UDache web forum, "Everyone Says DiDi's Commissions Are High, so Why Does DiDi Still Suffer 
Losses? (translated from Chinese)," April 22, 2019, accessed June 10, 2020, 
https://page.udache.com/public-biz/public-review/index.html#/articleQuestion?aid=72057594039559084&question=
1&channel=. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 ​Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "Didi Chuxing obtains operating license and national accreditation," DiDi, last 
modified March 1, 2017, accessed June 3, 2020, https://www.didiglobal.com/news/newsDetail?id=228&type=news. 
50 ​Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "DiDi releases study on job creation for laid-off workers in heavy-industry 
provinces," DiDi, last modified July 20, 2016, accessed June 3, 2020, 
https://www.didiglobal.com/news/newsDetail?id=267&type=news. 
51 ​Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "DiDi has created over 21 million jobs," DiDi, last modified March 24, 2018, 
accessed June 3, 2020, https://www.didiglobal.com/news/newsDetail?id=329&type=news. 
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Incentives and Subsidies 
 
Ride hailing companies in oligopolistic markets around the world spend large amounts of money 
on driver incentives in order to both attract drivers to the platform and keep them on the 
platform. Ride hailing companies that operate in markets without much competition do not avoid 
this problem entirely, but they can spend much less on driver incentives because they can employ 
other mechanisms to get drivers to sign up for their platform. Drivers saw a significant decrease 
in incentives following both the merger with Kuaidi Dache in 2015 and the merger with Uber in 
2016, but driver earnings have since rebounded and stabilized given the overwhelming demand 
in the market. Although the initial decline in subsidies hurt driver earnings, the increase in 
demand on DiDi following the mergers in part compensated for this original decrease, and 
drivers have been able to achieve a steady income. 
 
During its first two years, Didi Dache competed aggressively with Kuaidi Dache, and both 
companies gave out substantial subsidies to drivers to convince them to drive for their platform.  52
Because traditional taxis had already existed for a long time in the markets that ride hailing 
platforms were trying to break into, rideshare companies charged lower fares than traditional 
cabs so that people would choose to take Didi Dache or Kuaidi Dache over a taxi.  However, 53
due to the two-sided nature of the market, rideshare companies also had to supplement driver 
earnings with incentives so that they could maintain an adequate supply for their demand. As 
such, Chinese ride hailing companies had always used an incentive pay system to convince 
drivers to drive, and these incentives became the primary way that rideshare platforms competed 
with each other for drivers and market share.  54
 
When Uber first entered the Chinese market, Uber and DiDi engaged in a price war by pushing 
down and subsidizing fares for riders.  At the same time, they competed for the same driver pool 55
by giving their drivers substantial incentives. During this time, the two companies were each 
spending over a billion dollars every year to get riders and drivers on their platform, and Uber 
suffered more than 2 billion dollars in losses. ,  One type of subsidy that DiDi offered was an 56 57
extra payment that was given to drivers who drove more than a set number of rides in a 
week-long period; at times, this subsidy amounted to more than the total fare that passengers 
52 ​Dowling, "How Didi," Crunchbase. 
53 ​Qingjun Wu et al., "Labor control in the gig economy: Evidence from Uber in China," ​Journal of Industrial 
Relations​ 61, no. 4 (August 20, 2019): 584, https://doi-org.proxy.library.upenn.edu/10.1177/0022185619854472. 
54 Ibid. 
55 ​James Crabtree, "Didi Chuxing took on Uber and won. Now it's taking on the world," Wired, last modified 
February 9, 2018, accessed June 9, 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/didi-chuxing-china-startups-uber. 
56 ​Stone and Chen, "Uber Slayer," Bloomberg. 
57 ​Crabtree, "Didi Chuxing," Wired. 
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were paying for that ride.  Because of incentives like these, some drivers experienced a 58
pronounced decrease in their earnings following the DiDi Uber merger. In 2015, some drivers 
were earning CNY 10,000 each month, but in April of 2018, drivers earnings were only around 
CNY 6,000 to CNY 7,000 yuan, a 30% to 40% decrease from before.  As a result, drivers were 59
often working 16 to 17 hours a day to get more rides and increase their incomes.  Most recently, 60
in 2018, DiDi competed with Meituan-backed Shouqi Yueche and spent around $1.7 billion on 
various subsidies and discounts.   61
 
Even after its merger with Kuaidi in 2015, DiDi had only captured around 55% percent of the 
market share of the ride hailing industry in China.  As this percentage has risen to over 95%, the 62
market has also experienced several rounds of price wars with different competitors. Although 
DiDi no longer spends as prodigiously on driver incentives and rider subsidies as during its days 
of competing with Kuaidi, Uber, and Shouqi Yueche, it has also not stopped giving drivers 
incentives altogether and is reported to spend around $4 billion annually on subsidies for riders 
and incentives for drivers combined.  While this spending alone is not enough to compensate for 63
drivers’ losses in incomes following the mergers and exits of different players from the market, 
the demand for DiDi has also increased dramatically with the market share. Given that DiDi is 
now the dominant player in the Chinese ride hailing market by a mile, almost all riders use DiDi. 
Over time, as riders have migrated from using other platforms to using DiDi, driver earnings 
have also restabilized. Although drivers from other platforms also switched to driving for DiDi, 
the amount by which demand has grown on DiDi far outstrips the amount by which supply has 
grown. Consequently, with the current level of incentives and the large amount of demand for 
the service, DiDi drivers’ earnings have naturally reached a stable point.  
 
KPI-Based Management 
 
During the years that DiDi was competing with Uber, DiDi gave out incentives to drivers across 
the board because the goal was to enlarge the diver pool and outcompete Uber by getting any and 
58 ​Jiaru Bai et al., "Coordinating Supply and Demand on an On-Demand Service Platform with Impatient 
Customers" (working paper, December 20, 2017), 30, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2831794. 
59 ​Singapore Press Holdings, "Higher fares slammed after Uber exits China," The Straits Times, last modified April 
1, 2018, accessed June 11, 2020, 
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/higher-fares-slammed-after-uber-exits-china. 
60 ​Hui Yu, "The Destiny of Web Platform Workers in China: Employees, Nothing or a 'Third Option'?," ​Japan 
Labor Issues​ 2, no. 8 (August/September 2018): 96, https://www.jil.go.jp/english/jli/documents/2018/008-12.pdf. 
61 ​Lulu Yilun Chen, "Beleaguered Didi Is Said to Lose $585 Million in Just Six Months," Bloomberg, last modified 
September 7, 2018, accessed June 22, 2020, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-07/beleaguered-didi-is-said-to-lose-585-million-in-just-six-mont
hs. 
62 ​Dowling, "How Didi," Crunchbase. 
63 ​Zhixuan Fang, Longbo Huang, and Adam Wierman, "Prices and subsidies in the sharing economy," ​Performance 
Evaluation​ 136 (December 2019): 2, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.peva.2019.102037. 
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all drivers onto the DiDi platform. However, with Uber exiting the market, DiDi was able to shift 
its attention toward driver quality and rider experience, and the company has since implemented 
a number of new KPI-based management tactics. Besides tightening the requirements for 
becoming a driver, DiDi has also grown more strict about driver ratings and cancellation ratings 
and will deactivate a driver’s account if his/her average rating falls below 4.5 stars, if their 
cancellation rating jumps too high, or if the driver commits a serious traffic violation.  64
Furthermore, DiDi guarantees driver compliance with regulations by utilizing periodic checks by 
DiDi staff who pretend to be normal passengers; in cases where drivers fail this check, their 
accounts may also become deactivated.  65
 
Beyond controlling for the quality of drivers who actively drive for the platform, in late 2016, 
DiDi also began assigning rides based on certain metrics. DiDi’s intelligent ride-matching 
algorithm uses the company’s Service Credit Score system in order to determine which drivers 
are assigned which rides, with drivers with higher scores receiving more favorable rides.  The 66
Service Credit Scores are a comprehensive measure of a driver’s service quality and take into 
account not only response time and pickup time but also in-trip services and post-ride services.  67
This ride-matching system allows DiDi to differentiate between its drivers and directly reward 
higher-performing drivers by giving them better rides that generate more income. As DiDi has 
gained more market share, the company has also begun prioritizing driver quality and brand 
image. Consequently, DiDi not only tracks key metrics (service quality, cancellation rating, 
driver rating, etc.) for its drivers but also makes decisions regarding account deactivation and 
ride assignment based off of them.  
 
Social Impact and Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
As a platform with such a large user base, DiDi has also used its position and resources for the 
social impact of its drivers and riders, as well as the community at large. To begin, over 5 million 
DiDi drivers came from Chinese industries that face overcapacity, and they’ve found a way to 
earn their livelihoods through driving for the platform.  DiDi has also rolled out several CSR 68
initiatives, including the DiDi Driver Foundation, which provides financial aid to drivers’ 
families in need, and the DiDi Cares Foundation, which works with research institutes and 
universities to conduct and publish research on driver health. Both of these foundations were 
64 ​Yu, "The Destiny," 98. 
65 Ibid. 
66 ​Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "Didi rolls out a comprehensive 'Service Credit Scores' system aimed at connecting 
service quality with differentiated driver assignments and income," DiDi, last modified September 12, 2016, 
accessed June 3, 2020, https://www.didiglobal.com/news/newsDetail?id=253&type=news. 
67 Ibid. 
68 ​Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "Corporate Social Responsibility," DiDi, accessed June 1, 2020, 
https://www.didiglobal.com/about-didi/responsibility. 
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established in late 2016, and DiDi has continued to devote money and resources to them in the 
years after.  Although DiDi’s focus during its first four years was primarily on defeating its 69
competitors, with its position solidified in 2016, DiDi has fully dedicated itself to leveraging its 
platform and capabilities to improve not only operational efficiency and driver income but also 
social impact and safety.  
 
Grab 
 
Company Overview  
 
Grab was founded in Malaysia in June of 2012 by Anthony Tan and Tan Hooi Ling, and the 
company originated because the co-founders wanted to provide a safe mode of transportation for 
people in Southeast Asia.  Currently, Grab is headquartered in Singapore and operates in eight 70
countries in the region, and it competes aggressively with Gojek in several of these markets, 
especially Indonesia. In 2018, Grab seized control of the Singaporean ride hailing market after 
acquiring Uber Southeast Asia; as a result of that deal, Uber took a 27.5% stake in Grab.  71
 
Even though Grab exists in several different markets across the Southeast Asian region, the 
company takes a hyperlocal approach to each market and caters its product to the differing needs 
and dynamics of the markets.  Instead of making broad generalizations about Grab’s strategy 72
and operations in the region at large, this section of the paper looks solely at Grab’s past and 
current situations in Singapore, a market where Grab is the dominant player. Although Gojek 
also operates in Singapore, it has a much smaller market share than Grab, and the Competition 
and Consumer Commission of Singapore (CCCS) estimates that post-merger, Grab holds 
between 80% and 90% market share in the ride hailing market in Singapore.  As a result, Grab 73
does have, to a large degree, monopoly control over the Singaporean ridesharing industry. 
 
As a small city-state, Singapore has an extraordinarily well-developed public transport system 
but is also uniquely suited for rideshare. For one, the high taxes, congestion charges, and 
Certificate of Entitlement (COE) make it tremendously expensive to own a car there.  The COE, 74
69 Ibid. 
70 Anonymous Grab employee #1, Zoom interview by author, July 5, 2020. 
71 ​Russell, "Grab's acquisition," TechCrunch. 
72 Arvind Swaminathan, Zoom interview by author, August 3, 2020. 
73 ​Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, ​Notice of Infringement Decision: Sale of Uber's Southeast 
Asian business to Grab in consideration of a 27.5% stake in Grab​, 59, September 24, 2018, accessed August 17, 
2020. 
74 ​Yoolim Lee, "The Cab Ride That Nearly Killed Me Changed How I Think About Ride-Hailing Apps," 
Bloomberg, last modified January 19, 2019, accessed May 23, 2020, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-01-19/a-grab-ride-nearly-killed-me-ride-sharing-needs-to-get-safer
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an additional fee on top of the price of the vehicle, can cost up to S$50,000 and is subject to 
renewal after 10 years, at which point the car owner either sells or scraps the car.  This 75
regulation makes rideshare a convenient alternative to buying and driving your own car and 
subsequently a highly demanded service.  
 
Unlike DiDi, which never received a ruling regarding its merger with Uber China, Grab was 
fined after its merger with Uber’s Southeast Asia business and has since been subject to 
regulations imposed by the CCCS, the competition watchdog in Singapore. When news of the 
Grab Uber deal first broke out, the CCCS expressed concerns about the acquisition violating 
Section 54 of Singapore’s Competition Act.  The CCCS found that the merger led to a 76
substantial decrease in competition in the ridesharing industry and that the combined market 
share of 80% to 90%, which is far greater than their threshold of 40%, constituted sufficient 
cause for intervention.  After the merger, the CCCS passed its Infringement Decision, and this 77
decision stipulated, among other things, that Grab pay a S$13 million fine and end its exclusive 
arrangements with taxi companies, which previously gave Grab unique access to the fleets and 
drivers of Trans-Cab, Silver Cab, and Premier Taxis. ,  Moreover, in keeping with the CCCS’ 78 79
objective of ensuring competition, the decision required that Grab maintain its prior pricing and 
commission rates and not change them from where they were before March 26, 2018, the date of 
the Grab Uber announcement.  80
 
In response to the CCCS decision, the Head of Grab Singapore Lim Kell Jay stated that 
“Competition exists. This week, two companies have already come out to say that they are going 
to launch their ride-hailing apps in Singapore and elsewhere in the region. And that’s just in 
ride-hailing. Passengers continue to have many other transport choices. They can book taxis via 
75 Spencer Teng Chee Ang, Zoom interview by author, July 20, 2020. 
76 ​Russell, "Grab's acquisition," TechCrunch. 
77 ​CCCS Singapore, "Grab-Uber Merger: CCCS Imposes Directions on Parties to Restore Market Contestability and 
Penalties to Deter Anti-Competitive Mergers," Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, last modified 
September 24, 2018, accessed July 4, 2020, 
https://www.cccs.gov.sg/media-and-consultation/newsroom/media-releases/grab-uber-id-24-sept-18. 
78 ​Aradhana Aravindan, "Singapore fines Grab and Uber, imposes measures to open up market," Reuters, last 
modified September 23, 2018, accessed July 4, 2020, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-grab-singapore/singapore-fines-grab-and-uber-imposes-measures-to-open-u
p-market-idUSKCN1M406J. 
79 ​Singapore Economic Development Board, "Grab pushes digital innovation to stay ahead of the game," Singapore 
Economic Development Board, last modified March 15, 2017, accessed July 3, 2020, 
https://www.edb.gov.sg/en/news-and-events/insights/innovation/grab-pushes-digital-innovation-to-stay-ahead-of-the
-game.html. 
80 ​CCCS Singapore, "Uber/Grab merger: CCCS Issues Interim Measures Directions," Competition and Consumer 
Commission of Singapore, last modified April 13, 2018, accessed July 4, 2020, 
https://www.cccs.gov.sg/media-and-consultation/newsroom/media-releases/uber-grab-imd-13-april-18. 
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taxi apps, take street-hail taxis, car-pool, take public trains and buses, anything.”  However, the 81
CCCS noted that the entrance of a few small ride hailing apps into the market does not constitute 
significant competition because Grab still holds an overwhelming majority of the market share 
and that it’s difficult to break into the rideshare industry because of the network effects and high 
barriers to entry.  82
 
Becoming a Driver 
 
Due to the litany of licensure requirements laid out by Singaporean law, the process for 
becoming a driver for Grab in Singapore is both time-consuming and expensive. While some 
drivers choose to drive for Grab with a rental car, other drivers will purchase their own car. 
Although the high costs and COE associated with buying a car in Singapore make rideshare a 
highly sought-after service in that market, they also mean that operating costs for drivers are 
enormously high. After acquiring or renting a car, drivers must study for and take a written exam 
as well as undergo a medical screening and a thorough background check.  Before 2018, a lot of 83
the drivers who did not pass the background check for Grab ended up driving for either Gojek or 
Uber.  Following the merger, drivers from other platforms came back to Grab, but many drivers 84
who did not meet the safety requirements for the background check the first time around were 
never onboarded onto the app because Grab had taken a strong stance regarding safety 
requirements and driver quality.  85
 
Singaporean law further requires that rideshare drivers obtain either a Taxi Driver's Vocational 
Licence (TDVL) or a Private Hire Car Driver's Vocational Licence (PDVL), which drivers can 
apply for after they’ve held their driver’s license for at least two years.  Beyond proving that 86
they’ve had their driver’s license for over two years, applicants must also provide their National 
Registration Identity Card (NRIC) and proof of commercial insurance for their vehicle.  87
Moreover, applicants must pay a S$100 fee to convert their vehicle to Z10/Z11 classification in 
accordance with the requirements laid out by the Land Transport Authority (LTA).  88
 
81 ​Grab, "A message to all our passengers and drivers from Head of Grab Singapore," Grab, last modified March 29, 
2018, accessed June 8, 2020, 
https://www.grab.com/sg/blog/pulse-of-singapore/a-message-to-all-our-drivers-and-passengers-from-head-of-grab-s
ingapore/. 
82 ​CCCS Singapore, "Grab-Uber Merger," Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore. 
83 ​Lee, "The Cab Ride," Bloomberg. 
84 Anonymous Grab employee #4, Zoom interview by author, July 30, 2020. 
85 Ibid. 
86 ​Grab, "Drive with Grab using your own car in 4 steps," Grab, accessed June 4, 2020, 
https://www.grab.com/sg/drive-with-grab-using-your-own-car/. 
87 Ibid. 
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Given that this process is quite cumbersome, Grab has made an effort to facilitate the onboarding 
process and invested S$10 million in GrabCar in 2017 to cover the fees (application, medical 
exam, training, and test fees) for acquiring a PDVL.  Grab also partnered with the Singapore 89
Taxi Academy (STA) to launch ExpressOne, which helps drivers obtain their PDVL by offering 
training sessions, free coaching, reimbursement for costs, and test registration for English 
language certification exams.  Evidently, a lot of these requirements for becoming a Grab driver 90
are not determined by Grab but rather by the Singaporean government, so there are not many 
notable changes from before the merger to after the merger. However, it is interesting to note that 
following the merger, one of the biggest challenges that Grab encountered was actually moving 
drivers to the platform.  In Singapore, the government regulations made signing up to be a 91
driver for Grab a tedious and time intensive process, so it took a lot of time to migrate drivers 
from Uber over to Grab. 
 
Insurance Coverage 
 
Because Grab was founded with the intention of guaranteeing safe transportation in Southeast 
Asia, insurance coverage has been a priority for the company since relatively early on. In fact, 
Grab was the first ride hailing company to provide its drivers and riders with insurance 
protection above the required commercial auto insurance.  In March of 2016, Grab first released 92
its free Personal Accident Insurance policy, which covers all drivers and riders at no cost in the 
case of accidental death (within 12 months of the accident), permanent disability, or injury.  At 93
the time, the maximum insurance coverage for drivers and riders from this policy was $250,000 
per vehicle.  In cases where multiple vehicles were involved in the accident, the insurance could 94
pay up to $2.5 million for a given accident.  Now, according to Grab’s website, the Group 95
Personal Accident Insurance that all drivers and riders get free of charge provides up to $13,500 
of coverage for medical expenses, disability, and death that result from accidents that happen 
89 ​Grab, "Grab Announces $10 Million Investment in Singapore for GrabCar," Grab, last modified March 9, 2017, 
accessed July 3, 2020, 
https://www.grab.com/sg/press/consumers-drivers/grab-announces-10-million-investment-singapore-grabcar/. 
90 Grab, "Grab teams up with the Singapore Taxi Academy to help all drivers earn an income as licensed 
chauffeurs," Grab, last modified January 24, 2018, accessed June 5, 2020, 
https://www.grab.com/sg/press/consumers-drivers/grab-teams-up-with-the-singapore-taxi-academy-to-help-all-drive
rs-earn-an-income-as-licensed-chauffeurs/. 
91 Anonymous Grab employee #4, Zoom interview by author, July 30, 2020. 
92 ​Grab, "Trust & Safety," Grab, accessed June 4, 2020, https://www.grab.com/sg/safety/. 
93 ​Grab, "Grab Provides Free Personal Accident Insurance for Passengers and Drivers," Grab, last modified March 3, 
2016, accessed June 4, 2020, 
https://www.grab.com/sg/press/social-impact-safety/grab-provides-free-personal-accident-insurance-for-passengers-
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during a Grab trip.  While this is still a large amount of money for Grab to be covering under its 96
free accident insurance, this new maximum for insurance coverage under Grab’s free accident 
insurance policy seems to be substantially less than what it was when the insurance was first 
rolled out. In early 2018, Grab, like DiDi, diversified and moved into the financial services 
industry, and this drop in coverage amount under the free accident insurance may very well be a 
move that encourages drivers and riders to purchase additional insurance plans on top of Grab’s 
free one. For example, the Personal Accident Plus insurance covers all of the same circumstances 
(accidental death, permanent disability, burns, and medical expenses) as the Group Personal 
Accident Insurance, but it goes beyond to free policy to cover the user at all times so that he/she 
is protected even when he/she is not driving for Grab.  The plan operates on a monthly premium 97
model, where users pay a set amount (ranging from $3.50 to $31) each month according to the 
plan that they’ve chosen.  98
 
Besides Group Personal Accident Insurance (and Personal Accident Plus), Grab users also have 
access to Prolonged Medical Leave (and Prolonged Medical Leave Plus), Auto Excess, and 
Critical Illness Insurance. Prolonged Medical Leave is made available to all Grab drivers in the 
Emerald Circle, a tier-based program that drivers qualify for by accumulating enough points 
through driving and maintaining a high enough average driver rating.  The plan pays out a set 99
percentage of the driver’s earnings in the last 90 days to the driver during their medical leave or 
hospitalization and ensures that they still have a source of income during those times.  Like the 100
Personal Accident Plus insurance, the Prolonged Medical Leave Plus insurance operates based 
on a monthly premium for drivers and covers not just earnings from Grab but also earnings from 
other income sources.  While the Personal Accident Insurance and Prolonged Medical Leave 101
Insurance are both provided to drivers free of charge, drivers can also choose to purchase Auto 
Excess Insurance and Critical Illness: Pay Per Trip (CIPPT) Insurance, which work in similar 
ways through daily or per trip premiums.  102
 
Evidently, Grab offers many more types of insurance to its drivers than is standard in the ride 
hailing industry, and it is able to do so in part because of the market control it wields and in part 
96 ​Grab, "Personal Accident Plus," Grab, accessed July 3, 2020, 
https://www.grab.com/sg/driver/insure/personal-accident-plus/. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 ​Grab, "Prolonged Medical Leave Insurance," Grab, accessed July 4, 2020, 
https://www.grab.com/sg/driver/insure/prolonged-medical-leave-insurance/. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
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exclusively for Grab Driver-Partners," Grab, last modified August 1, 2019, accessed June 5, 2020, 
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because the company itself has expanded into the financial service industry in the last two years.
 As a company with a large driver base, Grab is able to provide drivers with a cheap form of 103
insurance because the insurance companies with whom it partners (Chubb, NTUC Income, etc.) 
give Grab preferential rates to access its driver pool. Moreover, given that these insurance 
companies give Grab much more reasonable insurance rates than the actual insurance market, 
Grab is then able to tailor these insurance policies to its drivers and launch programs like 
micro-insurance, which is a lot easier for drivers to purchase than insurance that require one-time 
payment.  When Grab set out to create these insurance programs for its drivers, it was because 104
the company saw a gap in insurance protection and a pain point that they could help address. In 
fact, the Prolonged Medical Leave Insurance program was created through a partnership with the 
National Private Hire Vehicles Association (NPHVA), which illustrates Grab’s attention to its 
drivers’ demands and dedication to using its industry dominance for social good.   105
 
As a whole, Grab operated at a large enough scale such that it could work with insurance 
partners to provide coverage for drivers at an equitable rate. Given that many drivers in the 
region are not well-versed when it comes to financial services and insurance and likely did not 
have accident insurance prior to Grab’s Personal Accident Insurance, they would have 
encountered significant financial hardships if they had been in an accident. In the past few years, 
Grab has taken care to pay attention to drivers’ needs and pain points, and with its market control 
and large driver base, Grab has had the ability to provide drivers with different types of 
insurance at a more cost effective rate.   106
 
Driver Earnings 
 
Because the CCCS fixed Grab’s fare structure and commission rate to where it was prior to the 
merger, driver earnings in Singapore have for the most part stayed the same. Although Grab is 
currently unable to change its pricing structure due to government regulation, Head of Grab 
Singapore Lim Kell Jay remarked that Grab would not increase its fares even if the regulation 
did not exist.  Prior to the merger, Grab had made two significant changes to its fares, although 107
the structure (pricing based on a base fare, per kilometer rate, and per minute rate) has stayed the 
same. In 2016, Grab adjusted its fares such that the base fare decreased by S$0.50 from S$3.50 
103 ​Grab, "Grab and Chubb sign partnership to provide innovative in-app insurance solutions throughout Southeast 
Asia," Grab, last modified March 13, 2018, accessed June 5, 2020, 
https://www.grab.com/sg/press/others/grab-and-chubb-sign-partnership-to-provide-innovative-in-app-insurance-solu
tions-throughout-southeast-asia/. 
104 Anonymous Grab employee #5, Zoom interview by author, August 1, 2020. 
105 Jia Yi Chong, Zoom interview by author, July 20, 2020. 
106 Anonymous Grab employee #1, Zoom interview by author, July 5, 2020. 
107 ​Mediacorp, "Allow us to 'freely compete', Grab urges Government," Channel News Asia, last modified March 30, 
2018, accessed July 3, 2020, 
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/allow-us-to-freely-compete-grab-urges-government-10090686. 
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to S$3.00 and the per kilometer rate decreased by S$0.10 from S$0.90 to S$0.80.  Even with 108
this decrease in fares, in 2017, Grab drivers in Singapore earned an average hourly wage that was 
10% higher than the average wage in the country.  In January of 2018, Grab again decreased its 109
base fare by S$0.50, and the fares have since stayed the same at a base fare of $2.50, a per 
kilometer rate of S$0.50, and a per minute rate of S$0.16.  As of late 2018, Grab drivers could 110
expect to earn an average wage of around S$25 per hour during non-peak hours and S$30 per 
hour during peak hours.  Throughout this time, the commission rate has stayed the same, with 111
Grab taking at most a 20% commission from each ride.  This rate is consistent with the industry 112
average in other rideshare markets around the world.  
 
When Grab first decreased its fares in 2016, drivers expressed their dissatisfaction and 
complained that the lower fares made it more difficult for them to earn a living through driving. 
However, Grab’s motivation for reducing fares at the time was so that it could increase demand 
and strike a better balance between marketplace supply and demand. Lim Kell Jay explained that 
“A top priority is our driver partners and we expect this fare revision to attract even more 
GrabCar passengers. This is part of a larger, holistic drivers’ programme to increase their net 
incomes in a sustainable way.”  In a two-sided market where customers want to pay lower fares 113
for their rides while drivers want to earn more money per ride, the economics are much more 
focused on the long term than on a single ride. Although drivers were receiving less money from 
individual transactions following the decrease in fares, Grab was tapping into the two-sided 
network effects in the market by lowering prices so that more customers would use the service.  114
Each time Grab lowered its prices, it was in an effort to grow demand in a healthy way so that 
drivers benefit.  And if these changes succeeded in encouraging more riders not just to try Grab 115
but to stay with it and use it consistently for the future, then driver earnings would gradually 
increase in the long run.  
 
108 ​Grab, "Grab the Most Affordable Car Ride with New GrabCar Fares," Grab, last modified April 18, 2016, 
accessed June 4, 2020, 
https://www.grab.com/sg/press/tech-product/grab-the-most-affordable-car-ride-with-new-grabcar-fares/. 
109 ​Grab's 5th Anniversary Special Report​, 15, accessed June 4, 2020, 
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110 ​Grab, "#AskGrab: Pricing," Grab, last modified December 6, 2018, accessed June 8, 2020, 
https://www.grab.com/sg/blog/news/askgrab-pricing/. 
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drivers," Mothership, last modified September 6, 2018, accessed August 17, 2020, 
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Even though Grab’s pricing structure and commission rate stayed the same after the merger, the 
CCCS declared that effective fares increased by between 10% and 15% after the deal.  Grab 116
maintained that it did not increase its fares, but this discrepancy likely exists because the CCCS 
measures effective fares as the amount that riders pay after any subsidies or discounts while Grab 
considers its fares to be the amount before the discount.  In any case, Grab’s pricing structure 117
remained exactly the same after March 2018 as per the Infringement Decision released by the 
CCCS.  
 
Incentives and Subsidies 
 
Grab drivers responded to the Grab Uber merger in 2018 similarly to how DiDi drivers reacted to 
the DiDi Uber merger in 2016, as many drivers voiced their concerns about Grab reducing its 
incentives after acquiring Uber.  Drivers complained that the changes in incentive payouts 118
following the merger made it difficult to accurately predict and gage their income levels, and 
drivers took to social media platforms like Facebook to express their worries.  119
 
While there was a significant dip in incentives as Grab began to phase out of giving drivers so 
many incentives, the new demand that arrived on the platform after Uber exited the market made 
up for the reduction in incentives. After the merger, demand for Grab services far outstripped the 
supply, with the lengthy process for new drivers to get onboarded onto the platform exacerbating 
this imbalance.  As such, driver earnings were not as heavily impacted by the decrease in 120
incentives as some drivers had anticipated simply because there were so many jobs for drivers to 
take.  In fact, driver utilization, which refers to the proportion of time a driver spends fulfilling 121
rides out of all the time that they spend on the Grab app, soared to the highest it has ever been.  122
Because the supply side of the market is just as important if not more important than the demand 
side, Grab obviously does not want to see its driver earnings tank.  The company has to keep 123
earnings at a certain level in order to ensure that drivers want to drive for the Grab platform. This 
meant that even though Grab was decreasing its incentives, it still rigorously tracked driver 
earnings so as to make sure that drivers were still making enough money through working on the 
platform.  
116 ​Aravindan, "Singapore fines," Reuters. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Fann Sim, "Grab-Uber merger: Drivers worried about incentives, car rental contracts," Channel News Asia, last 
modified March 27, 2018, accessed July 4, 2020, 
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When Grab was competing with Uber, it gave out driver incentives in an unsustainable way, and 
the company was quickly burning through investor money. Grab rolled out different incentive 
programs each week, and the incentive schemes were constantly changing based on the market 
because the company had to have enough supply to fulfill demand at all times.  At times, 124
drivers would earn up to S$1,500 to S$2,000 a week purely from incentives, and the incentives 
would count for up to 40% to 50% of the drivers’ income.  125
 
After Grab acquired Uber and attained greater market control in the region, it focused its 
attention on achieving greater profitability, which meant phasing out of unsustainable incentive 
programs that were popular pre-merger and redesigning incentive structures for the future.  126
Since 2018, there has been a larger emphasis on guaranteeing that drivers’ incomes are stable 
and encouraging drivers to work consistently on the platform.  For example, instead of giving 127
out a lot of per trip incentives that benefit drivers for every ride they complete, Grab now has 
more streak-based incentives and average fare guarantees, which promise drivers a certain 
amount of money if they consistently drive for Grab or if they are able to complete a set number 
of rides.  One example is Grab’s Super Steady Streak incentive, which rewards drivers who 128
have driven over 200 trips per month over several consecutive months.  Moreover, if drivers 129
are on Auto Accept, they will qualify for certain incentives.  In short, the incentive schemes 130
have pivoted away from large, unsustainable subsidies for drivers and toward more carefully 
calculated benefits that encourage drivers to work consistently for Grab.  
 
Two years after the merger first took place, the marketplace is well-balanced enough such that 
incentives only constitute a small portion of drivers’ earnings and income.  Rather than 131
depending on incentives to make a living on the platform, as was the case when Grab was 
competing with Uber, drivers are increasingly viewing incentives as more of an extra bonus that 
motivates them to take more trips or drive more frequently on the app. Lastly, despite the 
reduction in incentives since the merger with Uber, driver happiness has generally been 
improving, which suggests that Grab has done a good job of satisfying drivers’ needs and 
ensuring their incomes in the years since.  132
124 Anonymous Grab employee #5, Zoom interview by author, August 1, 2020. 
125 Jia Yi Chong, Zoom interview by author, July 20, 2020. 
126 Anonymous Grab employee #5, Zoom interview by author, August 1, 2020. 
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KPI-Based Management 
 
Although Grab did not have the option of selectively giving out its incentives while it was 
competing with Uber, Grab now has a robust KPI-based system for rewarding drivers. This 
system has helped Grab pursue higher driver quality and rider safety in the past few years, and 
the platform has been able to motivate drivers to engage in certain positive behaviors (ie. not 
cancelling rides, cleaning up their car, treating their passengers kindly) using its incentives. Grab 
bases its incentives off of a driver’s Acceptance Rating (AR), Driver Rating (DR), and 
Cancellation Rating (CR), and drivers with the highest acceptance and driver ratings and lowest 
cancellation rates qualify for the best incentives.  Furthermore, drivers get access to certain 133
rebates based on their service ratings and the number of rides that they’ve fulfilled.   134
 
Additionally, the existence of these ratings as well as other key metrics allows Grab to segment 
its driver pool and target specific groups of drivers with its incentives. For one, Grab is able to 
much more easily differentiate between its part-time and full-time drivers.  As a result, when 135
Grab makes a decision about a new incentive scheme, it is in a position where it can decide 
whether the incentive should benefit all of the drivers or just the full-time drivers.  With Uber 136
out of the market, Grab’s motivation for giving drivers incentives is not to win a price war but 
rather to target and reward a segment of its drivers.  Specifically, many of these incentives are 137
targeted for high-performing, full-time drivers because Grab wants to establish healthy long-term 
relationships with them, and it’s a conscious decision for Grab to be rewarding the drivers who 
work longer hours and are more consistent on the app. However, as a result of these targeted 
incentive schemes, Grab has also seen its driver base churn, with some of the part-time drivers 
leaving the platform.  138
 
This KPI-based system extends beyond incentives as well. In Singapore, Grab is very strict about 
driver quality because the company is looking to build long-term sustainability and its brand 
image. As such, if a driver’s cancellation rating is too high or a driver’s acceptance rating is too 
low, Grab will ban them from the platform.  This ability to heavily control for driver quality is 139
a key difference between a market where there are other competitors and a market where Grab is 
the monopoly.  If Grab were still competing with other rideshare platforms, the company 140
133 ​Grab, "How to check incentive status," Grab, accessed June 5, 2020, 
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would have neither the liberty to target incentives to certain segments of the driver population 
nor the privilege to ban drivers who do not meet its standards from the platform.  
 
Social Impact and Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has always been at the core of Grab’s mission, and the 
resources and capabilities that came with acquiring market control in Singapore have enabled 
Grab to better serve the country and its drivers. To date, Grab has hosted digital literacy clinics 
for over 3,000 senior citizens in Singapore.  Moreover, the company has provided safety 141
training for over 1.4 million drivers across all of its markets, and 429,000 drivers have also been 
trained to report human trafficking.  During Covid-19, Grab worked with the Singaporean 142
government to whitelist around 2,000 drivers to transport healthcare workers to and from 
hospitals and around 2,000 more drivers to transport people for Covid testing purposes.  143
 
Besides engaging in social impact for the broader community, Grab has also launched programs 
that are designed to help Grab drivers. Within Grab, there is a driver experience team dedicated 
to improving driver earnings and increasing drivers’ income sources beyond driving on the 
platform.  Furthermore, Grab as a whole pays a lot of attention to driver needs, and in 144
Singapore, drivers can speak with Grab employees about their concerns and demands at a 
predetermined location every Thursday.  In addition, Grab works closely with labor unions like 145
the National Private Hire Vehicles Association (NPHVA) to understand drivers’ pain points; 
both the MediSave co-contribution program and Grab’s Prolonged Medical Leave Insurance 
were created because of Grab’s partnership with the NPHVA.   146
 
Each time Grab gets rid of one of its incentive programs to rebalance marketplace supply and 
demand, it endeavors to make up for it by introducing some sort of benefit or program that would 
help the drivers in a different, nonmonetary way.  For instance, Grab has training programs that 147
teach drivers the skills that they might need to move into a different industry.  As a company, 148
Grab is easily able to reach out into its network and develop partnerships with training institutes, 
and Grab has stepped in to fill this need because it recognizes that drivers want to improve 
themselves and that it has the ability to help them. Throughout the years, Grab has also provided 
drivers with fuel discounts, subsidized mobile subscription plans, and education scholarships for 
141 ​Grab, "Grab for Good," Grab, accessed July 3, 2020, https://www.grab.com/sg/grab-for-good/. 
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144 Anonymous Grab employee #4, Zoom interview by author, July 30, 2020. 
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drivers’ children.  Although each one of these benefits goes beyond Grab’s core business and 149
responsibility as a ride hailing company, Grab has nevertheless chosen to help its drivers by 
investing its time, money, and resources into these services. This seems counterintuitive to a 
monopoly’s profit-maximizing tendencies, but Grab has been firm in its commitment to helping 
its drivers, and the market power and influence that Grab now holds have enabled the company 
to fully pursue social impact on top of its daily operations. 
 
Findings 
 
Having described in-depth DiDi and Grab’s respective policies towards and treatment of their 
drivers, this paper will next discuss several key findings regarding the nature of monopolistic 
rideshare companies. This section of the paper will first elaborate on four central findings before 
moving on to present recommendations for both rideshare companies and government entities. 
 
To begin, contrary to drivers’ assumptions that their incomes would decrease significantly 
following a merger or acquisition in the industry, the overwhelming demand in the market keeps 
their earnings at a relatively steady level. By nature, the ride hailing market is an undersupplied 
market because as long as people need to travel from one place to another, they will continue to 
demand ridesharing services. On the other hand, by virtue of rideshare being a part of the gig 
economy, the driver pool changes from hour to hour, day to day, and week to week. Even if 
drivers are consistent with the times that they are driving, they are rarely consistent with where 
they are picking up and dropping off rides, which creates even more variability in the supply. As 
a result, when all of the supply and demand exists on one singular platform, as is the case with a 
monopolistic rideshare market, drivers will have enough jobs to keep their earnings stable. When 
DiDi and Uber China merged in 2016 and Grab and Uber Southeast Asia merged in 2018, 
drivers in China and Singapore worried that their earnings would decrease when Uber exited the 
market and the price war ended. Although the two mergers did substantially reduce the amount 
of incentives that DiDi and Grab gave out to the drivers, driver incomes did not suffer 
dramatically following the mergers because all of the demand migrated so quickly to the 
platform.  
 
Secondly, monopolistic rideshare companies are interested in retaining their drivers for the long 
run and will act to keep these drivers on their platform so that they can continue to make use of 
the two-sided network effects that are present in the market. As a result, even though many 
drivers expected not just incentives but also fares to decrease, prices actually remained relatively 
stable and commission rates did not change. In most cases, ride hailing companies decrease their 
fares because they want to balance supply and demand and there are not many other mechanisms 
149 ​Grab, "Grab and NTUC," Grab. 
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that they can use to do so. However, when a rideshare company has attained sufficient market 
share in a market, decreasing fares as a means of stabilizing marketplace economics becomes 
fairly ineffective, so there is no motivation for the company to continually change its pricing 
structure. At the same time, monopolies in the rideshare industry are hesitant to increase their 
commission rates because they do not want the large group of drivers they have finally gotten 
onto their platform to churn. Moreover, the ride hailing industry is interesting in that monopolies 
in the market still heavily compete with other modes of transportation, including traditional taxis 
and public transportation. Even though these competitors do not compete with companies like 
DiDi and Grab directly in the same market, they nevertheless constrain certain business decisions 
that ride hailing companies make. Most notably, ride hailing monopolies in markets with robust 
public transportation systems are unable to significantly increase their prices because they will 
lose most of their demand. 
 
While the first two findings deal with how, contrary to existing assumptions and expectations, 
certain circumstances within the ride hailing market stay the same even after a merger, the next 
two findings consider how monopoly power in the rideshare industry changes corporate strategy 
in a way that benefits drivers. When a ride hailing company has obtained monopolistic market 
control of a market, that company is able to leverage its market position to engage in greater 
social impact and corporate social responsibility. During a price war with its competitors, 
ridesharing companies typically devote most of their resources to fighting the battle on the 
ground through large incentives and discounts that are subsidized by the company. This is not to 
say that these companies do not partake in CSR but rather that their resources to do so are 
limited. Once a company has undergone an M&A that gives it monopoly control over the 
market, the company is able to redivert a portion of its time and money toward programs that 
help benefit the drivers and the community. Although some would argue that monopolistic 
companies would not spend on social impact initiatives because they are not directly profitable, 
DiDi and Grab illustrate that it is in the best interest of the company to both establish a positive 
brand image in the market and engage in initiatives that will help its drivers and prevent churn. 
Furthermore, this market position enables these companies to establish more effective 
partnerships and programs for the sake of social impact. 
 
Lastly, for DiDi and Grab, acquiring monopolistic market control in the rideshare industry 
helped kickstart and propel their diversification into other industries, which include food 
delivery, mobile e-payments, financial services, hotel reservations, and ticket booking.  This 150
horizontal diversification strategy has proved instrumental in carrying both companies through 
150 ​Singapore Economic Development Board, "Ride-hailing apps race to grow in the region through Singapore," 
Singapore Economic Development Board, last modified June 1, 2019, accessed July 4, 2020, 
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h-singapore.html. 
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Covid-19, during which the transportation industry mostly came to a halt. With its core ride 
hailing business consolidated and solidified, monopolistic ridesharing companies are able to 
engage in greater diversification and make use of new synergies. Furthermore, given their hold 
on the ride hailing industry, monopolistic rideshare companies can utilize their scale and reach in 
the market to provide other key services that are demanded by their driver base. With DiDi and 
Grab both moving into the financial services industry, drivers had greater access to different 
insurance policies and coverage options at a price that was much lower than in the general 
market. However, it is possible that once rideshare companies start providing drivers with 
insurance coverage, they would begin to view insurance as less of a benefit that all drivers 
deserve and more of an avenue towards greater profitability, as illustrated by the decline in 
maximum coverage under Grab’s Free Personal Accident Insurance. Regardless, this 
diversification creates new opportunities for drivers to earn their incomes through different ways. 
Rideshare companies are thus able to direct their energy and resources toward augmenting their 
ecosystem, allowing for new synergies between industries to emerge. 
 
Although both DiDi and Grab have done a good job of taking care of their drivers, this research 
paper presents several recommendations for places upon which they can improve. Since the two 
companies have devoted so much time and money to launching initiatives like free accident 
insurance, training programs, critical illness micro-insurance, and financial aid for drivers’ 
families, they should now direct their attention to increasing awareness of these programs so that 
more drivers can benefit from them. Some of these programs have grown popular among the 
drivers, but DiDi and Grab should consider bolstering their marketing efforts of these programs 
to their drivers so that they reach a larger segment of their target audience. In addition, given that 
it was both time-consuming and cumbersome for drivers to migrate to DiDi or Grab after Uber 
exited the market, DiDi and Grab may want to evaluate their current onboarding process and 
work with government officials to streamline the process. Naturally, licensure requirements for 
becoming a driver are largely dictated by the government, but it may nevertheless be worthwhile 
to conduct an assessment of the process. One final note is that while DiDi and Grab have helped 
provide certain forms of insurance for their drivers, this protection is still far from enough, 
especially in times of difficulty like Covid-19. In the past few months, the government has 
stepped in to protect drivers in these two countries. Since DiDi and Grab have both diversified 
into financial services and insurance, the two companies could further invest in their finance 
groups in an effort to expand their range of offerings for drivers.  
 
The findings from this paper suggest that in the rideshare industry, monopolies may well be more 
responsible to its drivers and more socially optimal than duopolies or oligopolies. Because DiDi 
and Grab have become much more focused on brand image, sustainability, and supply 
management for the long run after their mergers, governments in countries with multiple 
competitors in the ride hailing market should not seek to block mergers and acquisitions that 
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could potentially form monopolies in the industry. Instead, they should actively work with the 
players in the market so that in the case where a singular rideshare company becomes the 
monopoly, they will be able to collaborate for the benefit of the drivers and the community. This 
also suggests that in the U.S., rather than so strongly fighting Uber and Lyft, the government 
should begin building a more cooperative relationship with the two companies. If one of them 
eventually comes to take over the other and dominate the market, the government would be in a 
good position to partner with them to address driver needs and increase social impact initiatives. 
Even if that does not happen in the near future, it is nonetheless important to establish a solid 
relationship so that the government can increasingly point the companies towards greater social 
impact, in the same way that the Singaporean and Chinese governments have done so for Grab 
and DiDi.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In closing, the market structure of a ride hailing industry has a notable bearing on the companies 
that operate within it. In investigating both how DiDi and Grab have changed from before their 
mergers to now and how the two monopolistic rideshare companies differ from other ride hailing 
platforms around the world, it has become obvious that a M&A in the rideshare industry 
significantly impacts corporate strategy and decision making. These changes in pricing policies, 
insurance coverage, driver incentives, and CSR initiatives have a significant impact on the driver 
experience.  
 
This paper looks at DiDi in China and Grab in Singapore as examples of ride hailing companies 
that have captured most of the market share in their countries and presently wield monopolistic 
market control over the industry. While this comparative study of the two is limited in scope, it 
nevertheless provides a starting point for gaining a better understanding of not just the rideshare 
industry outside of the U.S. but also the impact of different market structures in the industry on 
drivers. This research finds that in the cases of DiDi and Grab, monopolies in the ridesharing 
space may in fact be more efficient and socially optimal because they leverage available 
resources and market power for diversification as well as greater social impact. The ride hailing 
industry is one that is constantly evolving, and further research into how differing market 
structures impact the driver experience in markets beyond China and Singapore may be worth 
pursuing.  
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